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1. Introduction. 
Cooperative ownership and enterprise have always 
been favoured by socialist theory and practice, from the 
Owenite experiments of 1830s to Yugoslav ''associationist 
socialism'' of the last two decades. In the Marxist-Leninist 
brand of "realised socialism", however, cooperatives have 
often been treated with some ambi valenc·e. Marx regarded 
cooperatives as a potential though not actual expression of 
the communist ideal of "free associated producers" 2_; Lenin 
favoured cooperatives but primarily in the sphere of 
commodity distribution ;;?._; even in his 1923 articles "On co-
~- An earlier version of this paper was presented at a 
panel discussion on Soviet cooperatives, with the 
participation of Professor Abel Aganbegyan of the Soviet 
Academy of Sciences and of Lanfranco ~urci President of the 
Italian League of Cooperatives, Villa d'Este, Cernobbio, 14 
June 1988; it was also presented at the Fifth International 
Conference of IAFESM (International Association for the 
Economics of Self-Management), Vienna, 6-8 July 1988. 
Useful comments were made by participants in both events as 
well as by Greg Andrusz, Phil Hanson, and in particular 
Renzo Daviddi; their help is gratefully acknowledged but 
they should not be held responsible for any remaining error 
or omission. 
2_. "If co-operative production is not to remain a sham 
and a snare; if it is to supersede the Capitalist system; if 
united co-operative societies are to regulat~' national 
production upon a common plan, thus taking it under their 
own control, and putting an end to the constant anarchy and 
periodical convulsions which are the fatality of Capitalist 
production what else, gentlemen, would it be but 
Communism, "possible" Communism?" (Address of the General 
Council of the International Working Men's Association on 
the Civil War in France, 1871, written by Marx who was then 
correspondi"ng secretary for Germany and Holland; in Marx 
1966, p.73; see also Marx's Critique of the Gotha programme, 
end of section III). Dellenbrant's (1988) argument that 
Marx was of two minds, regarding cooperatives sometimes as 
inferior to state enterprises (allegedly in Marx 1966) does 
not seem to be supported by textual analysis. 
;;?._. the workers' cooperatives that have a 
tremendous part to play in the proper organisation of 
distribution'' of consumer goods and es~ecially food, wishing 
"the conversion of the workers' co-operatives into a single 
1 
operation", where he argues that "the only task ... that 
remains for us ~s to organise the population in co-operative 
societies", Lenin ~entions only trade and agricultural 
productJ.on ~. excludJ.ng the "commanding heights" of the 
economy traditionally.reserved to the state as a higher form 
of .collectJ.ve ownershJ.P~.· In practice from the end of NEP 
un~J.l .recently Soviet cooperative enterprises have consisted 
prJ.marJ.ly of large. collective farms (kolkhozy) and of 
consumptJ.on cooperatJ.ves especially in housing; kolkhozy 
however were vJ.rtually undistinguishible from state farms 
J..e.. sovkhozy, because they were not self-managed 
J.nstJ.tutJ.~ns but centrally administered agencies, and they 
were payJ.ng out guaranteed wage incomes instead of income 
shares. In other socialist countries collective farms have 
had the same. features; where production cooperatives were 
present outsJ.de agrJ.culture, as for instance in Poland and 
Hungary, .on the contrary they acted as a shell for small-
scale .PrJ.vate enterprise. The 1977 Soviet constitution 
recogn~se~ cooperative ownership as a temporary phenomenon 
(ch. ~· drt. 10-18, see Andrusz 1988). The drive towards 
economJ.c reform has been identified with de-collectivisation 
of ag~J.cultural cooperatives (as in Poland in 1956) and the 
promotJ.on of cooperatives outside agriculture (a~ in Hungary J.n 1982). ~ 
the The latest wave of "radical" economic reform in 
Soviet Union has led to the important rediscovery and 
revamping of cooperatives. At the Xxvn Party Congress in 
1986 M.S. Gorbachev stated that cooperatives had "far from 
exhausted their potential"; at a speech in Khabarovsk in 
July 1986 he referred to manufacturing cooperatives, "which 
were eliminated in the 'fifties and 'sixties, evidently 
prematurely" (quoted by Teague, 1988). The State Enterprise 
Law of 1987 already recognised the importance of cooperative 
enterprises; a number of Party and Government decrees 
followed, which prompted a rapid rise of new cooperatives 
(though it has been suggested that reports may have been 
exaggerated by official complacency). At the Plenary 
Session of the Central Committee (June 1987) defended Gorbachev 
cooperatives on the ground that they "help to 
satisfy pressJ.ng consumer demands and thereby substitute for 
the 'black' economy and all sort of other economic abuses 
Moscow City consumers ;-, --::c:-:o:-:m=-m=u-=n:-:e::-,;:-,--(;-s-p_e_e_c~h:--_d_e_l_i_v_e_r_e_d __ t_o_a 
meeting of delegates from the Moscow Central Workers' 
Cooperative, 26 November 1918· · L 
, J.n enin 1964 p. 179 and 183). He also stressed the ' Menshevik roots of the 
cooperative movement, p. 180. 
t i· Published in Pravda on 26 and 27 May 1923 ; English 
rans ation reprinted in Lenin 1964, pp. 359-366. 
~. Lenin also argued with Kautsky about the limits of group ownership. 
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and criminal offences which presently occur" (Andrusz, 
1988). A Draft Law on Soviet Cooperatives was published by 
Pravda on 6 March 1988; a strong speech in defense of 
cooperatives especially in agriculture was made by Gorbachev 
at the Fourth All-Union Congress of Collective Farmers on 26 
March. The Draft Law was publicly discussed, amended 
significantly and "progressively" in the light of discussion 
and criticism, swiftly approved in May 1988 and implemented. 
In the year from July 1987 the total number of cooperatives 
in the Soviet Union grew from 3,709 to 32,561, while their 
total turnover increased from roubles 29.2 mn to roubles 
1.04 bn in the same period.£ 
The new Law on Soviet Cooperatives allows any 
group of at least three people over 16 to form a cooperative 
enterprise for the organisation of production or 
consumption, only subject to registration of its statute, 
and to undertake any activity not expressly forbidden by 
law, acc6rding to principles of self-management, income 
sharing and the protection of members' ownership rights. 
Compared with existing practice, the new policy encourages 
a wider range of production activities on a larger scale. 
The new Law - a rambling and somewhat repetitive 
document, commenting on policy as well as setting new legal 
rules -specifically recalls but does not quote Lenin's 
ideas on cooperatives, and extolls the virtues of 
cooperation in no uncertain words: "Work in cooperatives is 
honourable and prestigious and is encouraged in every 
possible way by the state" (art. 1.4; references are to the 
final text unless specified otherwise). Indeed "The state, 
aided by the mass media, creates the most favourable 
ideological preconditions for cooperatives' activity and 
ensures everywhere the kind of moral and psychological 
climate in which each cooperative member is aware that by 
working in it he or she is performing important and socially 
useful work ... " (art. 29.4). The emphasis is such that it 
strongly suggests a reversal of previous policy, of course 
outside agriculture. Clearly cooperative development is 
part of perestroika, because of its potential mobilisation 
of workers' entrepreneurship, the expectation that it would 
raise supply especially of shortage goods and activate 
competition, the presence of economic democracy, self-
interest and effort-related reward all essential 
ingredients of perestroika (see Gorbachev 1987 and 
Aganbegyan 1988 who recalls Chayanov's contribution to the 
economics of cooperatives). However, cooperatives are 
controversial; for some "the co-operative movement carries 
within it the ger~ of the political and economic socialist 
§. Just ovet half of them, 16,324 with a turnover of 
roubles 528 mn, are in the Russian Republic; Ukraine has 
5,269 with a turnover of roubles 151.8 mn; Byelorussia, 
Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Georgia have over 1,000 each. 
Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania have respectively 609, 540 and 
917 (FT, 23 August 1988). 
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revolution of 1917 that was asphyxiated in the 1930s" 
(Andrusz, 1988), while others refer to the "rebirth of the 
kulak" (letter to Izvestia, quoted by Hanson 1988), and 
associate cooperatives with unbridled profiteeringz. 
The obvious economic attraction of cooperatives in 
the Soviet context is their ability to function as private 
enterprises would, i.e. as decentralised agencies more 
flexible and r~sponsive than state enterprises, however 
without abandon1ng the basic principle of social ownership. 
There is no doubt that the growth of the cooperative sector 
in production activities outside agriculture could 
contribute greatly to the "restructuring" and "acceleration" 
of Soviet development. through the filling of plan gaps, the 
adjustment to small 1mbalances, the utilisation of local 
resources and the absorption of the millions of workers 
which would be made redundant by the implementation of 
reform (although the growth of cooperatives may raise labour 
act1v1ty rates, as expected in art. 4.2; also~ second 
economy activities may be encouraged by the Law allowing 
multiple membership of production cooperatives by a sin~le 
person, and single membership by state employees, art. 1~). 
The Law r1ghtly talks of "immense potential" (Law preamble, 
p.3~. There are, hqwever, a number of limitations in the 
env1saged new regime for Soviet cooperatives. Some are due 
to the specific provisions of the Law: the detailed list of 
sectors of activity, their lack of competitive access to 
resources, their inability to set prices. Some are related 
to the general limitations of traditional cooperatives: 
~nefficiency deriving from likely attempts at maximising 
lncome per member, and investment bias due to the non 
appropriability of self-financed investment These 
limitations deserve more detailed illust~ation and 
discussion. 
2. Sectors of activity 
The cooperative enterprise is an independent legal 
entity with its own independent budget and limited 
liability; "entitled to engage in any kind of activity save 
those prohibited under the legislation of the USSR and its 
united republics" (art. 3.1; reference to republican 
legislation was not in the equivalent art. 2.1 Df the Draft 
Law). Consumer cooperatives are standard: they "meet the 
requirements of their members and citizens for trade and 
consumer services and the requirements of ·cooperative 
members for housing, dachas, garden plots, garages and 
parking spaces for vehicles, and socio-cultural and other 
-services". Production cooperatives instead "pr'oduce goods, 
product~ and Jobs and also provide paid 'services tn 
enterpr1ses, institutions, organisations and citizens'' (art~ 
3.2). However the very detailed list of what cooperatives 
z. "Do you want to hear the joke about co-ops?" "Yes." 
"Give me a rouble." 
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"are created and operate for" suggests that they should or 
at any rate are expected t0 stay away from the "commanding 
heights" of the Soviet economy, unless these could be 
regarded as falling under "technical production products" 
(produktsiya proizvodstvenno-tekhnicheskogo naznacheniya), 
which is unlikely. 
The Law indicates food, consumer goods and 
services as the areas of cooperative operation; more 
precisely, it lists: production, procurement, processing and 
sale of agricultural output, manufacture of consumer goods, 
collection and processing of secondary raw materials, the 
extraction of useful minerals, equipment repair and 
servicing, production services, building roads and houses, 
retail trade, public catering and consumer services, 
organisation of cultural leisure and medical aid, the 
provision of legal, transport, research, planning and design 
services; the final version adds to the list also fishing, 
timber processing, the extraction of fossil minerals (art. 
3.2). There are no limits to enterprise size (whether by 
membership, capital or turnover); the possibility of 
cooperatives reaching a large size is hinted in the faculty 
to open new offices and subsidiaries, granted in art. 5.4 
and an innovation respect to the Draft Law. Cooperatives 
can also engage in credit activities, directly lending to 
other enterprises or through banks which they may found 
(subject to registration with USSR State Bank, art. 23) or 
to the state (purchasing sertifikaty i.e. deposit 
certificates, or other securities); undertake joint 
activities with state enterprises, merge into activity-
specific or territorially-based associations. 
The range of activities listed in the Law would 
fit well the description of the scope of cooperatives 
actually represented throughout the world, even where no 
restrictions apply to the sector of operation~. This may be 
a realistic recognition of the unsuitability of the 
cooperative enterprise to activities with above average risk 
or capital-per-man, rather than a 'determinate policy of 
cooperative exclusion; either way, the list dilutes somewhat 
the notion of "immense potential" of the cooperative sector 
in the Soviet economy. 
An innovative aspect of cooperatives' sectoral 
scope is, on the contrary, their access to foreign trade 
(automatically for border trade, otherwise like for other 
enterprises, though presumably subject to ordinary licensing 
procedures), ability to retain part of their export earnings 
to finance their import requirements (art. 28.3) and to 
g. At present more than a third of Soviet cooperatives 
provide various types of domestic services; over 5,000 are 
in catering; 7,000 make some form of consumer goods, 5,640 
offer transport, sports and other facilities, and over 1,600 
use the discarded equipment from plants in some form of 
recycling process (FT, 23 August 1988). 
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participate in joint ventures (art. 28.4; with 
the Draft Law, the final version extends 
scientific cooperation to non-socialist countries). 
3. Access to resources 
respect to 
;technical-
The activity of cooperative enterprises is, first 
of all, "based on the labour participation of their 
members", but cooperatives can also hire the work of non-
members on a contractual basis. This provision (art.-12, 
mentioned above, and art. 25) has been interpreted by some 
commentators (for instance Hanson, 1988) as opening the 
possibility of private employment by Soviet cooperatives; 
however the spirit and the letter of the Law do not appear 
to go further than the hiring of part-time dependent labour 
pensioners or workers also employed in the state sector -
or the hiring of labour for a specific task and. fee. In 
fact, "A cooperative may employ under labour contract 
citizens who are not cooperative members with payment for 
their labour being agreed between the sides. Citizens 
working in a cooperative retain their pension, study grant 
and wages from the main job in full" (emphasis added, art. 
25.2). The corresponding art. 22.2 of Draft Law added "with 
no limitation on the size of earnings" leaving equalisation 
to fiscal policy, while the final version specifically 
confirms that the limitations do not apply to "persons 
working in cooperatives in the free.time left by their main 
job" (art.25.2, emphasis added). These provisions do not 
seem to reintroduce capitalist features in labour 
employment. 
Members' incomes are based not only on the quantity 
and quality of their labour but also on the ownership 
(contributed by members or later acquired through self-
finance or credit) and rental of.other means of production, 
on a contractual basis; cooperatives can in turn sell or 
rent their means of production or lend their funds (art. 
23.4). (They are subject to environmental and conservation 
constraints, presumably like other enterprises, art.9.2; the 
final version of the Law includes an obligation for the 
cooperative to compensate for any environmental damage 
caused by a violation of safety and conservation rules). 
Natural resources are allocated to cooperatives 
administratively, however ("under the procedure laid down by 
USSR and union republican legislation", art. 9.1), not on 
the basis of competitive bids; nor can they obtain 
competitive access to centrally allocated means of 
production, or to, resources held by other enterprises via 
take-overs or buy-outs. Thus, although the Law stresses the 
contractual nature "of cooperative enterprises' links with 
their economic enviropment (plans are drawn by the 
cooperative itself, and executed by means of contracts), 
administrative procedures are still present. In particular, 
"On matters concerning the use of natural resources 
cooperatives agree their plans with local soviet executive 
committees" (art. 18.3); detailed reports are submitted to 
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higher bodies, and are necessary 
ceRtralised supplies (art. 18.4). 
to ensure access to 
Cooperatives may use medium term (two years) and 
short term credit (12 months, for working capital), at 
interest rates respectively of the order of 0.75 and 1 per 
cent (3 per cent on overdue loans), more favourable than 
those applicable to state enterprises (respectively of 0.5-8 
per cent, and 10 per cent on overdue loans). 
Cooperative access to investment and intermediate 
goods is subject to the same mechanisms of central 
allocation applicable to state enterprises, i.e. mostly 
through Gossnab. There have been many reports in the Soviet 
press of state enterprises demanding large shares of 
cooperative profits in return for access to centrally 
allocated inputs; "the device of establishing a cooperative 
attached to (pri) a state enterprise will probably.be used 
as a means of getting centrally allocated inputs" (Hanson, 
1988). 
4. Management, unions and party 
The tri-partite division of power (troika) between 
management, trade union and party, characteristic of 
traditional state enterprises is reproduced within the 
cooperative; however, in the final version, party authority 
is considerably reduced. In the initial draft the party 
cell within the cooperative, beside its specific role of 
politically educating cooperative members, had the 
supervision of all cooperative activities and control over 
management: "The cooperative's party organisation, as the 
political nucleus of the collectives, operates within the 
framework of the USSR Constitution, directs the work of the 
entire collective and the trade union, Komsomol and other 
public organisations, ai;ld monitors the activity of the 
cooperative's board (chairman)" (art. 5.3, Draft Law). In 
the final · draft there is a greater emphasis on party 
political tasks, while retaining the party's generic 
"control over the economic activity and results of the 
cooperative" (art. 6.3 of final version). While the 
participatory nature of cooperatives (plus glasnost, 
specifically mentioned in art. 14.1) is bound to amalgamate 
the components of troika, with respect to the potentially 
centrifugal effects of such division of power in traditional 
state enterprises, the formalisation of a "directive" role 
of the party in cooperative economic life - albeit diluted 
in the final draft - seems at odds with the spirit of the 
Law, especially since party, union and Komsomol participate 
in their own right, next to the work collective, in decision 
making on enterprise activity. Moreover, it is not clear 
what the role of trade unions might be, in Soviet as well as 
in non-Soviet cooperatives, since members are also their own 
employers. 
Self-management is 
cooperative •· s general meeting 
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expressed 
of members, 
through the 
which elects a 
chairman to manage day-to-day affairs and elects a board (in 
large cooperatives); the general meeting deals with statute 
changes, audits, admissions and expulsions of members, pay, 
dues, plans, price setting (subject to limitations below). 
5. Cost-based pricing 
"Prices and tariffs for a cooperative's goods and 
services must reflect the socially necessary cost involved 
in producing and selling goods ... " (art. 19.10); there 
follows a reference to "quality ... and consumer demand" but 
it would be far-fetched to interpret this as implying 
market-clearing pricing, in view of simultaneous reference 
to "economically unjustified" excessive prices. This is 
perhaps the single most important limitation to cooperative 
autonomy and economic potential. A cooperative subject to 
strict cost-plus formulas will not be able to capture quasi-
rents from prompt response to temporary shortages or 
imbalances and therefore new cooperatives will not be set up 
to respond to such phenomena as quickly and effectively as 
they might be if prices were set at a market clearing level 
still with the due safeguards against monopolistic and 
oligopolistic behaviour. (If cooperatives were keen on 
income-per-man maximisation, however, a price rise generated 
by temporary shortage would lead to ·smaller or rigid 
membership and supply - according to the Ward-Vanek model -
and cost-based pricing would reduce that perverse response). 
6. Earnings 
Members' incomes are paid out of the cooperative's 
cash flow (though they may include also elements in kind), 
"in accordance with their labour inputs and also, in cases 
stipulated by statutes, in accordance with their 
contribution of property .. to the cooperative" (art. 13. 1), 
after due payment of social security contributions and tax. 
The tax rates on the income of cooperatives and 
their members is not fixed by the law on cooperatives (see 
section 9 below). Severe checks and penalties are aimed at 
restricting the cooperative's ability to avoid or evade tax 
suggesting that this is a serious preoccupation of 
lawmakers. Work conditions (health provisions, working 
hours, leave, etc.) are strictly put under the control of 
representative bodies. The pursuit of a "vigorous social 
policy", originally expected of the cooperative (art. 22.7 
of Draft Law) is dropped from the final version. 
In collective farms income sharing may be based on 
smaller _groups, i.e. "independent financially autonomous 
cooperatlve collectives whose income is formed by the end-
results of their economic activity" (art. 33.4), or on 
family contracts (including leasing of land and equipment). 
Collective farms also are expected to promote the use of 
private plots, by members and other citizens. 
8 
7. "Shares". 
Enterprises (cooperative and non) and state 
organisations can have shares (dolevoye uchastiye) in the 
property of cooperatives (art. 7.2); citizens who are not 
members may also "participate in forming the cooperative's 
property by way of contributions of money and materials" 
(art. 7.2); presumably these remain entitlements to the 
ownership of specific or replaceable items, on terms fixed 
at the time the property is conferred, not proportional 
shares in the totality of cooperative assets. 
However, the Law specifically stipulates that the 
enterprise can issue shares (aktsii) for sale to 
members of the cooperative and people working in it under a 
labour contract and to enterprises (organisations)", art. 
22.4. Shares are secured by cooperative property, cannot as 
a rule exceed gross annual income (for a capital/income 
ratio, say, equal to four, this implies that equity capital 
can at most cover 25 per cent of total capital); they are 
subject to members' preemption right. The cooperative "sets 
the invariable nominal value of shares for the entire period 
of their circulation and the procedure for paying the annual 
share dividend"; the annual dividend rate can be modified by 
a general meeting according to the cooperative cash flow. 
The notion of these "shares" suggests the 
possibility of individuals and institutions owning a 
percentage stake in the variable value of cooperative 
assets. However this is not the case, and "share" is a 
misnomer for what is later described as securities 
redeemable only at their fixed face value - though yielding 
a dividend which may vary according to cooperative 
performance. In theory the cooperative statutes might 
stipulate that, when the cooperative is liquidated, net 
assets could be distributed among members in proportion to 
their holding of "shares"; however the law decrees that at 
liquidation (outside agriculture) any net assets should be 
distributed to cooperative members, so that in any case 
shareholding would have to be restricted to current members. 
Moreover the right to vote does not belong to shares but to 
members regardless of their shareholdings (if any), whereas 
true "shares" would have to carry a vote and be freely 
transferable outside cooperative members. Provisions of 
this kind have not been discussed or even suggested and in 
practice are unlikely in the foreseeaole future. Thus the 
new Soviet cooperatives are far from restoring elements of 
the capitalist system. 
8. "Past labour" rights 
Membership tenure is protected: 
guarantees citizens the right of voluntarily 
leaving ... " (preamble to the Law, p. 3); 
property interests are also protected 
Presumably, however, leavers lose all except 
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"The la1-: 
joining and 
" ... members' 
(art. 4 .3). 
their pension 
rights financed out of social security payments, i.e. do not 
benefit from any increment in the value of cooperative 
assets occurred since the time of their association, 
although it is due to internal accumulation out of the 
income they have contributed to produce, and to the success 
of their enterprise. This important component of 
entrepreneurial reward, which the Yugoslav call "past 
labour" (although this seems to include only to the part of 
capital growth due to self-financed investment; see Uvalic, 
1987) is lost to workers at the time of withdrawal or 
retirement, unless this happens to coincide with cooperative 
liquidation in which case net assets are distributed to 
existing members (art. 44; except for agricultural 
cooperatives, see below). This may encourage repeated 
artificial liquidation and refounding of cooperatives or, 
alternatively, the distribution of a greater share of 
current income among members and greater use of credit in 
investment finance than otherwise would be the case (see 
Furobotn 1980, and Nuti 1988). This bias is not eliminated 
by the encouragement of cooperative-funded banks (the first 
of which was founded in Kazakistan in August 1988 with a 
million roubles initial capital) since cooperatives' self-
financed financial investment in banks is as unattractive, 
in comparison to distributing out cooperative's income to 
members, as investment in real plant ~- There is a 
provision, in the Soviet law, that seems designed to 
counteract this bias against self-financed investment, since 
cooperatives are said to be "obliged to augment" as well as 
safeguard and use efficiently their property (art. 7.4). 
However, this obligation in practice is no stricter than 
that of Yugoslav enterprises (which only have to maintain 
real capital) since no minimum growth rate is set to Soviet 
cooperative capital; indeed "A cooperative uses the 
financial resources at its disposal for production and 
social development as it sees fit, without restriction and 
irrespective of their origin" (art. 22.2). 
Collective farms are subject to a slightly 
different treatment, in that amounts equivalent to s~lf­
financed accumulation may be credited pro rata to special 
accounts of members, who then draw interest payments from 
them. However in case of liquidation net assets are 
transferred to other cooperatives, so that members claims 
are limited to .the reimboursement of their capital stake at 
its nominal value, without sharing in any capital growth 
which might be due to entrepreneurial success. 
-····--·------------,--
.::?..- Financial investment has the advantage of not 
raising the size of membership and therefore not diluting 
cooperative earnings;_ from this viewpoint investment in new 
capacity can be more or less attractive than financial 
investment according to its labour intensity (see Nuti, 
1988). 
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In brief while cooperative statutes may stipulate 
freely the terms 'of members withdrawal and cooperative 
liquidation, it is most unlikely that members might be able 
to walk out of a Soviet cooperative taking away their full 
share of their cooperative's net worth: ultimately this is 
what constrains the Soviet cooperative, just as much as the 
conventional Westen cooperative, to low risk low capital-
intensity activities. 
9. Further developments. 
An indication of current trends is given already 
by a comparison between the March Draft Law and the text 
approved in May. All the amendments introduced in the final 
version are in the direction of radical reform. As we have 
already seen, these involve republican-level flexibility, a 
reduction of the economic role of the party and other 
central organs. Moreover, a stricter relation is envisaged 
in the Law between the cooperative and local soviets, with 
which the cooperative collaborates and negotiates on 
important issues (housing programmes, hospitals, nurseries, 
schools); contributions for social activities are paid to 
local soviets. References to the economic initiative of the 
local soviet (and other non-specified organisations, 
presumably party institutions), on the contrary, have been 
eliminated from th~ Draft Law, in areas such as associations 
with state enterprises, change of activity and liquidation. 
Also, in the final version of the Law strict terms are fixed 
for authorities to refuse registration and hear an appeal 
(art. 11.7); a tribunal or a state arbitrator can be invoked 
to rule on conflicts of competence between cooperatives and 
state organs (art. 10.2). Each member is given a vote, 
regardless of his capital stake (art. 14.2). The powers of 
cooperative organs are clarified: the cooperat1ve counc1l 
deals with current issues not specifically attributed to the 
assembly; the president: is an executive; an auditors' 
commission controls the council's economic and financial 
activity (art. 14.4). The prohibition of utilising 
cooperative property "for personal gain" (art. 6.4 of the 
first draft) is modified to "for obtaining illegal incomes" 
(art. 7.4 of the Law). Finally, it is interesting that in 
the section on kolkhozy (Part V) this term is almost always 
replaced by the word "cooperative"; this is not a purely 
cosmetic change, as it seems to imply the replacement of 
contractual for obligatory procurements. Every single one 
of these changes is in the direction of Gorbachev''S "radical 
reform". 
At the Supreme Soviet of.- 24 May 1988 Prime 
Minister Ryzhkov presented the draft Law, stressirig the need 
for small and medium size enterprises, flexible and "geared 
directly to the market", of a kind that the state sector had 
not been able to provide. He announced that nearly 6,000 
new cooperatives had been founded in the previous three 
months, compared with 14,000 in the previous year and a 
half. At the same time he warned that local authorities and 
state bodies were trying to resist the growth of the sector 
11 
and prevent people from leaving state enterprises to work in 
cooperatives. "This is a far- fetched and feigned concern," 
he said. "It should be realised clearly that both 
sectors of the economy are equal. Anyone is entitled, just 
as envisaged in the draft law, to share in the cooperative 
movement" (FT, 25 May 1988). Normally the presentation of 
new laws to the Supreme Soviet for approval is a mere 
formality, but in this case there was a great deal of debate 
and amendments. Ryzhkov spoke of "200,000 observations" 
being raised during the discussion of the law. Opposition 
came both from conservatives, because of the implicit 
erosion of socialist control over the economy, and from 
reformers because of the high and discriminatory taxation on 
cooperative profits. Zhyvkov defended higher earnings for 
cooperative members: "vJhen working on a state order, they 
double or treble their productivity, and their members' 
earnlngs are correspondingly high," he said (average incomes 
paid by cooperatives are estimated to be between 1.5 and two 
times more than for workers in state enterprises).· The Law 
was approved, with effect from 1 July 1988. 
Taxation rat~s on cooperatjve and members' incomes 
were not indicated in the law, which only mentioned the 
possibility of rates being differentiated according to kind, 
sector and alms of cooperatives, and enabled the Council of 
Ministers to provide tax benefits "to provide incentive for 
the production of goods, jobs and services'' (art. 19.2 of 
draft law). Before the draft was discussed however a 
government decree had fixed particularly 'high, indeed 
punitive rates of progressive taxation on cooperative 
profits, up to 90 per cent. After considerable debate the 
decree was suspended, and no alternative rate has been 
fixed. 
At the Presidium of the Soviet Council of 
Ministers of 13 July the question of taxation of the incomes 
of cooperatives and their members was discussed (see the 
transcript of Soviet television reports, in BBC-SWB, 23 July 
1988). Finance Minister Gostev reported that initially 
cooperatives had paid to the state budget a small part of 
their taxable income, while cooperative members were taxed 
at the same rate as workers of state enterprises (who pay a 
tax rate between 8 and 13 per cent); however it had become 
apparent that cooperatives "started to direct everything, or 
nearly everythlng, that they earned into the payment for 
labour rather than into strengthening their material and 
technical base" (ibidern, p. 1); this put them at an unfair 
advantage over state enterprises, which do not distribute 
their_ whole income to,workers (p. 2). Gostev proposed 
taxatlon ra~es on cooperative taxable ~ncome of 5 to 30 per 
cent accordl~g to type'of activity (comparable to the 35 per 
cent ~ate pald_ by consumer_cooperatives), reduced by so per 
cent ln the flrst year of operation and by 25 per cent in 
the second year; contributions to charities would be 
exempted; further exemptions right down to zero rating could 
be gra~ted by local soviets. Taxable income of coope;atives 
is deflned as receipts minus material expenditure, i.e. 
gross value added, though the Ministry of Justice was in 
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favour of exempting investment expenditure from tax (ibidem, 
p.2). Gostev argued for progressive taxation of cooperative 
members, in view of their earnings reaching up to 1000 
roubles per month and more, compared to the average 200 
roubles per month for the other 120,000,000 workers in the 
economy. Other speakers at the meeting mentioned the 14-16 
hours working day of cooperative members, lack of breaks and 
holidays, the intensification of work, the poor working 
conditions in cooperatives; spoke of "sensationalism" 
exaggerating actual incomes, of the "tax on raw materials, 
equipment and transport'' implicit in cooperative procurement 
prices relatively to those paid by state enterprises 
(leather, for instance, is sold to citizens and cooperatives 
at a price six times that practiced to state enterprises). 
At the same meeting Dr Tatyana Koryagina, of the 
Economic Research Institute of the USSR State Planning 
Committee, reported that for the increase in retail trade 
turnover planned by the year 2005 to come from the 
cooperative sector (excluding kolkhozy), 30 million people 
would have to be employed in the sector, producing 15-18 per 
cent of national income (BBC-SWB transcript, p. 4). 
Academician Leonid Abalkin, Director of the Economics 
Institute of the USSR Academy of Science, stressed that the 
problem was not the level of incomes but, whether in the 
state of the cooperative sector, whether they had been 
"earned"; he opposed a tax regime different from that 
applicable to other workers or at any rate a tax rate higher 
than 25 per cent, and supported the deduction of investment 
from cooperative taxable income. 
At the end of August 1988 a "civil tax initiative" 
scheme was put forward by 100 cooperative chairmen 
(announced by Mr Ivan Yefremov Chairman of the Uspekh 
cooperative in Moscow, see FT, 27 August) suggesting a flat 
rate of 20 per cent on all incomes over 100 roubles a month 
(plus 100 roubles allowance per dependent). Mr Yefremov 
spoke of the "optimum tax rate" as that which "combines the 
highest earnings for the national budget~with the least loss 
of personal income", but the two criteria are likely to be 
irreconcilable: in general there is no way to avoid the 
dilemma between equality and efficiency. 
10. Conclusion 
There is no doubt that the Soviet cooperative 
sector has the "immense potential" stated in the Law, and 
that cooperatives have the fullest ideological and material 
6acking of Soviet leadership. Howe~er cooperatives are 
still subject to administrative measures of allocation of 
natural resources, centralised supply of materials and 
strict price controls, foreign trade licencing and limited 
access to foreign exchange. The new Soviet cooperative, in 
addition, is fully exposed to the dangers of traditional 
cooperatives, i.e. membership restrictive policy. rigid or 
perverse response to price change and investment biasses 
against self-finance and labour-using projects; the 
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introduction of shares might solve these problems but the 
Law envisages no more than variable interest bonds without 
vote, redeemable at face value (except in case of 
liquidation when a participation in cooperative net capital 
is possible, but only partially). The conflict between 
equality and efficiency in the taxation of cooperatives and 
their members has not been resolved. In these conditions it 
is doubtful whether Soviet cooperatives' "immense potential" 
will be fully realised. 
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